A Smooth Ambiguity Model of the Competitive Firm by Wong, KP
Title A Smooth Ambiguity Model of the Competitive Firm
Author(s) Wong, KP
Citation Bulletin of Economic Research, 2015, v. 67, p. S97-S110
Issued Date 2015
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/222581
Rights
Bulletin of Economic Research. Copyright © John Wiley & Sons
Ltd.; The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-
synergy.com; This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
License.
1A SMOOTH AMBIGUITY MODEL OF THE COMPETITIVE FIRM
Kit Pong Wong ∗
School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the optimal production decision of the competitive firm under price uncertainty
when the firm’s preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity is modeled by a second-
order probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective
beliefs govern the price risk. Ambiguity preferences are modeled by the (second-order) expectation
of a concave transformation of the (first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible
subjective distribution of the price risk. Within this framework, we derive necessary and sufficient
conditions under which the ambiguity-averse firm optimally produces less in response either to the
introduction of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails. In the case that
the price risk is binary, we show that ambiguity and greater ambiguity aversion always adversely
affect the firm’s production decision.
Keywords: ambiguity; ambiguity aversion; production
JEL classification numbers: D21, D24, D81
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal work of Sandmo (1971), the behavior of the competitive firm has been
the subject of considerable research in decision making under uncertainty (Batra and Ullah,
1974; Broll, 1992; Broll and Zilcha, 1992; Chavas, 1985; Viaene and Zilcha, 1998; Wong,
1996; to name just a few). Most of the extant models in the literature assume that the firm’s
preferences admit the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility representation.1
∗Correspondence: Kit Pong Wong, School of Economics and Finance, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam
Road, Hong Kong. Tel.: +852 2859 1044; Fax: +852 2548 1152; Email: kpwong@econ.hku.hk. The author
would like to thank Udo Broll, Klaus Zauner (the Editor), and two anonymous referees for their helpful
comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
1Notable exceptions are Paroush and Venezia (1979) and Wong (2012, 2014) who incorporate regret
theory into Sandmo’s (1971) model of the competitive firm under price uncertainty.
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Such a modeling approach rules out the possibility that the firm is unable to unambiguously
assign a probability distribution that uniquely describes the price risk, which gives rise to
ambiguity, or uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921).
The purpose of this paper is to incorporate ambiguity into the model of the competitive
firm under price uncertainty. We define uncertainty to be made up of two components,
risk and ambiguity. Risk aversion is the aversion to a set of outcomes with a known prob-
ability distribution. Ambiguity aversion is the additional aversion to being unsure about
the probabilities of outcomes. Dated back to the Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox, ambiguity
has been alluded to the violation of the independence axiom, which is responsible for the
decision criterion being linear in the outcome probabilities.2 The distinction between the
known-unknown and the unknown-unknown is relevant since individuals appear to prefer
gambles with known rather than unknown probabilities. Indeed, ample experiments (Chow
and Sarin, 2001; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1986; Sarin and Weber, 1993) and surveys (Chesson
and Viscusi, 2003; Viscusi and Chesson, 1999) have documented convincing evidence that
ambiguity aversion prevails.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) have recently developed a powerful decision criterion known as
“smooth ambiguity aversion” that is compatible with ambiguity averse preferences under
uncertainty (hereafter referred to as the KMM model). The KMM model features the
recursive structure that is far more tractable in comparison to other models of ambiguity
such as the pioneering maxmin expected utility (or multiple-prior) model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989).3 Specifically, the KMM model represents ambiguity by a second-order
2A vivid description of the Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox is from Keynes (1921). Consider the following
experiment with two urns, K and U. Urn K contains 50 red balls and 50 blue balls. Urn U contains 100 balls
(all balls are either red or blue), but the exact numbers of red and blue balls are not disclosed. Subjects are
asked to select from which urn they would like to draw a ball. They are rewarded if the color of their choice
is drawn. In this experiment, subjects typically select urn K, revealing aversion to ambiguity. To see this,
suppose that subjects believe that the probability of drawing a blue ball from urn U is p. Subjects should
prefer to draw a red ball or a blue ball from urn U than from urn K, depending on whether p is smaller
or greater than 1/2, respectively. If p = 1/2, subjects should be indifferent between the two urns. Since
subjects choose to draw from urn K, such paradoxical behavior can only be rationalized by allowing multiple
priors to be held by subjects on urn U. See also Dillenberger and Segal (2015) and Machina (2014).
3Skiadas (2013) shows that smooth ambiguity preferences can be approximated by preferences admitting
an expected utility representation in continuous-time or high-frequency models under Brownian or Poisson
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probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective
beliefs govern the price risk. The KMM model then measures the firm’s expected utility
under ambiguity by taking the (second-order) expectation of a concave transformation of the
(first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible subjective distribution
of the price risk. This recursive structure creates a crisp separation between ambiguity
and ambiguity aversion, i.e., between beliefs and tastes, which allows us to study these
two attributes independently.4 Another nice feature of the KMM model is that we can
apply the conventional techniques in the decision making under uncertainty in the context
of ambiguity (Alary et al., 2013; Gollier, 2011, 2014; Iwaki and Osaki, 2014; Osaki et al.,
2015; Snow, 2010, 2011; Taboga, 2005; Treich, 2010; Wong, 2015).
Within the KMM model, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which
the ambiguity-averse firm optimally produces less in response either to the introduction
of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails. These conditions
ensure that the ambiguity premium is negative (more negative as the firm becomes more
ambiguity averse), which reduces the firm’s certainty equivalent marginal revenue. The
firm as such is induced to cut down its optimal output level so as to restore the optimality
condition that the certainty equivalent marginal revenue is equated to the marginal cost of
production.
Since the conditions that ensure the ambiguity premium to be negative (more negative
as the firm becomes more ambiguity averse) are rather complicated, we derive more tangible
sufficient conditions under which ambiguity and greater ambiguity aversion adversely affect
the firm’s production decision. These conditions include the firm’s coefficient of relative
risk aversion not to exceed unity and its subjective beliefs to be ranked in the sense of first-
order stochastic dominance. Barham et al. (2014) document that the average coefficient of
relative risk aversion is 0.8 in their sample of Midwestern grain farmers in the U.S., which
uncertainty.
4The model of Choquet expected utility developed by Schmeidler (1989) and the maxmin expected utility
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) do not separate ambiguity preferences from ambiguous beliefs, and
therefore cannot provide a sensible notion of greater ambiguity aversion.
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is in line with the magnitudes of relative risk aversion found in many developing countries
(Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). In the context of a portfolio choice problem, Gollier
(2011) derives similar sufficient conditions under which a more ambiguity-averse individual
optimally invests less in a risky asset whose return is ambiguous. In the case that the
price risk is binary (Alary et al., 2013; Snow, 2011), we show that ambiguity and greater
ambiguity aversion always adversely affect the firm’s production decision. These results are
consistent with the results of Alary et al. (2013) and Snow (2011) on the propensities for
self-insurance and self-protection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II delineates the KMM model of
the competitive firm under price uncertainty. Sections III and IV examine how ambiguity
and ambiguity aversion affect the firm’s optimal production decision, respectively. Section
V concludes.
II. THE MODEL
Consider the competitive firm of Sandmo (1971) within the context of the KMM model.
There is one period with two dates, 0 and 1. To begin, the firm produces a single commodity
according to a deterministic cost function, C(Q), where Q ≥ 0 is the output level, and C(Q)
is compounded to date 1 with the properties that C(0) = C′(0) = 0, and C′(Q) > 0 and
C′′(Q) > 0 for all Q > 0.5 At date 1, the firm sells its entire output, Q, at the then
prevailing per-unit price, P˜ , which is not known ex ante.6 The firm’s profit at date 1 is
therefore uncertain and given by Π˜ = P˜Q − C(Q). The firm possesses a von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function, u(Π), defined over its profit at date 1, Π, with u′(Π) > 0 and
u′′(Π) < 0, indicating the presence of risk aversion.
The price risk, P˜ , is distributed according to an objective cumulative distribution func-
5The strict convexity of the cost function reflects the fact that the firm’s production technology exhibits
decreasing returns to scale.
6Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde (∼) while their realizations do not.
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tion (CDF), F ◦(P ), over support [P, P ], where 0 < P < P . The firm, however, is uncertain
about F ◦(P ) and thus faces ambiguity. Let F (P |θ) be the firm’s subjective CDF of P˜ over
support [P, P ], where θ is the realization of an unknown parameter, θ˜. The KMM model
represents ambiguity by a second-order subjective CDF of θ˜, G(θ), over support [θ, θ] with
θ < θ, which captures the firm’s uncertainty about which of the subjective CDF, F (P |θ),
governs the price risk, P˜ . Following Snow (2010, 2011) and Wong (2015), we assume that
the firm’s ambiguous beliefs are unbiased in the sense that the expected price risk is equal
to the objective price risk:
∫ θ
θ
F (P |θ)dG(θ) = F ◦(P ), (1)
for all P ∈ [P, P ].7
The recursive structure of the KMM model implies that we can compute the firm’s
expected utility under ambiguity in three steps. First, we calculate the firm’s expected
utility for each subjective CDF of P˜ :
U(Q, θ) =
∫ P
P
u[PQ−C(Q)]dF (P |θ). (2)
Second, we transform each (first-order) expected utility obtained in Eq. (2) via an ambiguity
function, ϕ(U), where U is the firm’s utility level and ϕ′(U) > 0. Finally, we take the
(second-order) expectation of the transformed expected utility obtained in the second step
with respect to the second-order subjective CDF of θ˜. The firm’s ex-ante decision problem
as such is given by
max
Q≥0
∫ θ
θ
ϕ[U(Q, θ)]dG(θ). (3)
Inspection of the objective function of program (3) reveals that we can separate the effect of
ambiguity, represented by the CDF, G(θ), from that of ambiguity preferences, represented
by the shape of the ambiguity function, ϕ(U).
7The assumption that the expected price risk is equal to the objective price risk is motivated by the
premise that the behavior of an ambiguity-neutral decision maker should be unaffected by the introduction
of, or changes in, ambiguity.
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We say that the firm is ambiguity averse if, for any given output level, Q, the objective
function of program (3) decreases when the firm’s ambiguous beliefs, specified by G(θ),
change in a way that induces a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the firm’s
expected utility. According to this definition, Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that ambiguity
aversion implies concavity for ϕ(U) (see also Neilson, 2010). They show further that the
maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is the limiting case when
ϕ(U) is extremely concave.8 Throughout the paper, we assume the firm to be ambiguity
averse so that ϕ′′(U) < 0.
The first-order condition for program (3) is given by
∫ θ
θ
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ) = 0, (4)
where Q∗ is the firm’s optimal output level, U(Q, θ) is given in Eq. (2), and
UQ(Q, θ) =
∫ P
P
u′[PQ− C(Q)][P −C′(Q)]dF (P |θ). (5)
Differentiating the objective function of program (3) twice yields
∂2
∂Q2
∫ θ
θ
ϕ[U(Q, θ)]dG(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
ϕ′′[U(Q, θ)]UQ(Q, θ)
2dG(θ)
+
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
ϕ′[U(Q, θ)]u′′[PQ−C(Q)][P −C′(Q)]2dF (P |θ)dG(θ)
−
∫ θ
θ
∫ P
P
ϕ′[U(Q, θ)]u′[PQ− C(Q)]C′′(Q)dF (P |θ)dG(θ) < 0, (6)
for all Q ≥ 0, where the inequality follows from the assumed properties of ϕ(U), u(Π), and
C(Q). It then follows from Eq. (6) that Eq. (4) is both necessary and sufficient for Q∗ to
the unique maximum solution to program (3).
8When ϕ(U) = [1−exp(−αU)]/α, Klibanoff et al. (2005) show that the maxmin expected utility model of
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) is the limiting case as the constant absolute ambiguity aversion, α, approaches
infinity under some conditions.
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III. AMBIGUITY AND PRODUCTION
In this section, we examine the effect of ambiguity on the firm’s optimal production decision.
To this end, we consider the benchmark case wherein there is no ambiguity in that the firm
knows the objective CDF of P˜ , i.e., F (P |θ) = F ◦(P ) for all P ∈ [P, P ] and θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Eq.
(4) as such reduces to
∫ P
P
u′[PQ◦ −C(Q◦)][P −C′(Q◦)]dF ◦(P ) = 0, (7)
where Q◦ is the firm’s optimal output level in the absence of ambiguity. Comparing Eq.
(4) with Eq. (7) yields our first proposition.
Proposition 1. Introducing ambiguity to the ambiguity-averse competitive firm reduces the
optimal output level, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦, if, and only if, the covariance between ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ˜)] and
UQ(Q
◦, θ˜) is negative.
Proof. Differentiating the objective function of program (3) with respect to Q, and evalu-
ating the resulting derivative at Q = Q◦ yields
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
ϕ[U(Q, θ)]dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q◦
=
∫ θ
θ
ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ)]UQ(Q
◦, θ)dG(θ). (8)
Taking expectations on both side of Eq. (5) with Q = Q◦ with respect to the CDF, G(θ),
yields
∫ θ
θ
UQ(Q
◦, θ)dG(θ) =
∫ P
P
u′[PQ◦ − C(Q◦)][P − C′(Q◦)]dF ◦(P ) = 0, (9)
where the first equality follows from Eq. (1), and the second equality follows from Eq. (7).
Using Eq. (9), we can write Eq. (8) as9
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
ϕ[U(Q, θ)]dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q◦
= CovG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, θ˜)], UQ(Q
◦, θ˜)}, (10)
9For any two random variables, X˜ and Y˜ , we have Cov(X˜, Y˜ ) = E(X˜Y˜ ) − E(X˜)E(Y˜ ).
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where CovG(·, ·) is the covariance operator with respect to the CDF, G(θ). It then follows
from Eqs. (4) and (6) that Q∗ < Q◦ if, and only if, the covariance term on the right-hand
side of Eq. (10) is negative. 2
Proposition 1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which the presence of
ambiguity adversely affects the firm’s production decision. This condition states that the
marginal ambiguity, ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ˜)] is negatively correlated with the marginal expected utility,
UQ(Q
◦, θ˜), at the optimal output level, Q◦, when ambiguity is absent. To see the intuition
for Proposition 1, we write Eq. (7) as
EF◦(P˜ ) +
CovF◦{u
′[P˜Q◦ −C(Q◦)], P˜}
EF◦{u′[P˜Q◦ −C(Q◦)]}
= C′(Q◦), (11)
where EF◦(·) and CovF◦(·, ·) are the expectation and covariance operators with respect
to the CDF, F ◦(P ). Eq. (11) states that the risk-averse firm optimally produces at the
output level, Q◦, that equates the certainty equivalent marginal revenue to the marginal
cost of production. We can interpret the second term on the left-hand side of Eq. (11) as
the risk premium demanded by the firm to compensate for its exposure to the price risk.
Given risk aversion, i.e., u′′(Π) < 0, this term is negative so that the certainty equivalent
marginal revenue is below the objective expected price, EF◦(P˜ ). The risk-averse firm as
such produces less than the optimal output level under certainty. This is a well-known
result of Sandmo (1971).
Using Eq. (1), we can write the right-hand side of Eq. (8) as
EF◦(P˜ ) +
CovF◦{u
′[P˜Q◦ −C(Q◦)], P˜}
EF◦{u′[P˜Q◦ −C(Q◦)]}
+
CovG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, θ˜)], UQ(Q
◦, θ˜)}
EF◦{u′[P˜Q◦ − C(Q◦)]}EG{ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ˜)]}
− C′(Q◦), (12)
where EG(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the CDF, G(θ). We can interpret
the third term of expression (12) as the ambiguity premium demanded by the firm to
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compensate for its exposure to ambiguity at Q = Q◦. Given that the covariance between
ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ˜)] and UQ(Q
◦, θ˜) is negative, the ambiguity premium is negative so that the
certainty equivalent marginal revenue is further reduced as compared to that in the absence
of ambiguity. To restore the optimality condition that the certainty equivalent marginal
revenue is equated to the marginal cost of production, the ambiguity-averse firm is induced
to produce less than Q◦ in response to the introduction of ambiguity.
While the result of Proposition 1 is intuitive, the necessary and sufficient condition
that a negative ambiguity premium induces the ambiguity-averse firm to produce less is
by no means informative. In the following proposition, we derive more tangible sufficient
conditions under which CovG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, θ˜)], UQ(Q
◦, θ˜)} < 0.
Proposition 2. Introducing ambiguity to the ambiguity-averse competitive firm reduces
the optimal output level, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦, if the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion,
R(Π) = −Πu′′(Π)/u′(Π), does not exceed unity, and if the parameter, θ, ranks the subjective
cumulative distribution function, F (P |θ), in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
Proof. Differentiating ϕ′[U(Q, θ)] with respect to θ yields
∂
∂θ
ϕ′[U(Q, θ)] = −
∫ P
P
ϕ′′[U(Q, θ)]u′[PQ −C(Q)]QFθ(P |θ)dP, (13)
where Fθ(P |θ) = ∂F (P |θ)/∂θ, and we have used integration by parts. Likewise, differenti-
ating UQ(Q, θ) with respect to θ yields
∂
∂θ
UQ(Q, θ) =
∫ P
P
{
u′[PQ−C(Q)]{R[PQ−C(Q)]− 1}
+[C′(Q)Q−C(Q)]u′′[PQ− C(Q)]
}
Fθ(P |θ)dP, (14)
where R(Π) = −Πu′′(Π)/u′(Π) is the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, and we
have used integration by parts. Since C(0) = 0, the strict convexity of C(Q) implies
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that C′(Q) > C(Q)/Q for all Q > 0. If R(Π) ≤ 1 and θ ranks F (P |θ) in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance, it follows from Eqs. (13) and (14) with Q = Q◦ that
CovG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, θ˜)], UQ(Q
◦, θ˜)} < 0. From Proposition 1, we have Q∗ < Q◦. 2
To see the intuition for Proposition 2, we follow Gollier (2011) and Taboga (2005) to
define:
H(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
ϕ′[U(Q◦, X)]
EG{ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ˜)]}
dG(X) =
EG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, X˜)]|X˜ ≤ θ}
EG{ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ˜)]}
G(θ), (15)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. It is evident from Eq. (15) that H(θ) = 0, H(θ) = 1, and H ′(θ) > 0 for
all θ ∈ [θ, θ] so that we can interpret H(θ) as the distorted second-order CDF of θ˜, where
the distortion factor, ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ)]/EG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, θ˜)]} is a Radon-Nikodym derivative. From
Eqs. (4), (6), (8), (9), and (15), we have Q∗ < Q◦ if, and only if,
∫ θ
θ
UQ(Q
◦, θ)dG(θ) = 0⇒
∫ θ
θ
UQ(Q
◦, θ)dH(θ) < 0. (16)
We can interpret the left-hand side of condition (16) as the first-order condition for program
(3) when the firm is ambiguity neutral. The right-hand side of condition (16) is then the
condition that ensures the ambiguity-neutral firm to reduce its optimal output level when
the second-order CDF of θ˜ is shifted from G(θ) to H(θ). Hence, the effect of introducing
ambiguity on the ambiguity-averse firm’s production decision is identical to the comparative
static result of a shift in ambiguity from G(θ) to H(θ) on the ambiguity-neutral firm’s
optimal output level.
Using Leibniz’s rule, we differentiate EG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, X˜)]|X˜ ≤ θ} with respect to θ to yield
∂
∂θ
EG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, X˜)]|X˜ ≤ θ} =
G′(θ)
G(θ)
{
ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ)]− EG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, X˜)]|X˜ ≤ θ}
}
, (17)
which, from Eq. (13), is positive (negative) if an increase in θ deteriorates (improves)F (P |θ)
in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, i.e., Fθ(P |θ) > (<) 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
10
10Proposition 2 holds even in the case that the sign of Fθ(P |θ) varies as θ changes. See the proof of
Proposition 2.
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It then follows from Eqs. (15) and (17) that H(θ) < (>) G(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) so that
H(θ) dominates (is dominated by) G(θ) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance
if Fθ(P |θ) > (<) 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
11 In this case, condition (16) holds if, and only
if, UQ(Q
◦, θ) is decreasing (increasing) in θ, which, from Eq. (14), is true if the firm’s
coefficient of relative risk aversion does not exceed unity, i.e., R(Π) ≤ 1.12
Following Alary et al. (2013) and Snow (2011), we consider the case that the underlying
risk is binary: P˜ = P with the objective probability p, and subjective probability, ρ(θ),
and P˜ = P with the complementary objective probability, 1−p, and subjective probability,
1− ρ(θ).13 It follows from Eq. (1) that EG[ρ(θ˜)] = p. In this case, Eq. (7) becomes
pu′[PQ◦ − C(Q◦)][P − C′(Q◦)] + (1− p)u′[PQ◦ − C(Q◦)][P − C′(Q◦)] = 0. (18)
We show in the following proposition that CovG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, θ˜)], UQ(Q
◦, θ˜)} < 0.
Proposition 3. Given that the price risk, P˜ , is binary, introducing ambiguity to the
ambiguity-averse competitive firm always reduces the optimal output level, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦.
Proof. Differentiating ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ)] with respect to θ yields
∂
∂θ
ϕ′[U(Q◦, θ)] = −ϕ′′[U(Q◦, θ)]ρ′(θ){u[PQ◦ −C(Q◦)]− u[PQ◦ − C(Q◦)]}, (19)
which has the same sign as that of ρ′(θ). Differentiating UQ(Q
◦, θ) with respect to θ yields
∂
∂θ
UQ(Q
◦, θ) = −ρ′(θ){u′[PQ◦ −C(Q◦)][C′(Q◦)− P ]
+u′[PQ◦ −C(Q◦)][P − C′(Q◦)]}, (20)
11If θ ranks F (P |θ) in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance, one can analogously show that
G(θ) and H(θ) are also ranked in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance. In this case, Q∗ < Q◦
if the firm’s coefficient of relative prudence, P (Π) = −Πu′′′(Π)/u′′(Π) is positive and less than two, i.e.,
0 < P (Π) < 2. See also Gollier (2011).
12Gollier (2011) derives similar sufficient conditions under which an ambiguity-averse investor demands a
smaller amount of a risky asset whose return becomes ambiguous.
13Alary et al. (2013) and Snow (2011) examine the effect of ambiguity aversion on self-insurance and
self-protection, where a binary structure (loss versus no-loss states) is natural.
A Smooth Ambiguity Model of the Competitive Firm 12
which has the opposite sign to that of ρ′(θ) because P < C′(Q◦) < P . It follows immediately
from Eqs. (19) and (20) that CovG{ϕ
′[U(Q◦, θ˜)], UQ(Q
◦, θ˜)} < 0 irrespective of the sign of
ρ′(θ). From Proposition 1, we have Q∗ < Q◦. 2
To see the intuition for Proposition 3, we write the marginal expected utility, UQ(Q
◦, θ),
as
UQ(Q
◦, θ) = u′[PQ◦ − C(Q◦)][P −C′(Q◦)]
−ρ(θ){u′[PQ◦ −C(Q◦)][P −C′(Q◦)] + u′[PQ◦ − C(Q◦)][C′(Q◦)− P ]}. (21)
Since P < C′(Q◦) < P , it follows from Eq. (21) that UQ(Q
◦, θ) decreases with an increase
in ρ(θ). Given Eq. (18), UQ(Q
◦, θ) changes sign from positive to negative at ρ(θ) = p as
ρ(θ) increases. Hence, a marginal reduction in output from Q◦ reduces U(Q◦, θ) when the
expected utility is high, i.e., when ρ(θ) < p, and increases U(Q◦, θ) when the expected utility
is low, i.e., when ρ(θ) > p. Since EG[ρ(θ˜)] = p, Eq. (18) implies that the expected value of
U(Q◦, θ) remains unchanged for a marginal change in output from Q◦. Hence, a marginal
reduction in output from Q◦ gives rise to a mean-preserving contraction in the distribution
of U(Q◦, θ˜). The firm, being ambiguity averse, has a concave ambiguity function, ϕ(U),
thereby choosing to cut down its production, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦, in response to the introduction
of ambiguity.
IV. AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND PRODUCTION
In this section, we examine the effect of greater ambiguity aversion on the firm’s optimal
production decision when ambiguity prevails. To this end, we follow the comparative notion
of “more ambiguity aversion” defined by Klibanoff et al. (2005). Specifically, an ambiguity
function, ϕˆ(U), is said to represent more ambiguity aversion than the original ambiguity
function, ϕ(U), if the firm with ϕ(U) prefers an uncertain act over a pure risky act whenever
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the firm with ϕˆ(U) does so. As shown by Klibanoff et al. (2005), this is true if, and
only if, ϕˆ(U) is more concave than ϕ(U) in the Arrow-Pratt sense, i.e., −ϕˆ′′(U)/ϕˆ′(U) >
−ϕ′′(U)/ϕ′(U) for all U . Hence, the firm becomes more ambiguity averse when there is a
concave transformation of ϕ(U), i.e., ϕˆ(U) = K[ϕ(U)], where K(·) satisfies that K ′(·) > 0
and K ′′(·) < 0.
The more ambiguity-averse firm’s ex-ante decision problem is given by
max
Q≥0
∫ θ
θ
K{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}dG(θ). (22)
The first-order condition for program (22) is given by
∫ θ
θ
K ′{ϕ[U(Q†, θ)]}ϕ′[U(Q†, θ)]UQ(Q
†, θ)dG(θ) = 0, (23)
where Q† is the firm’s optimal output level. It is evident that Eq. (6) remains valid when
we replace ϕ(U) by K[ϕ(U)]. Comparing Eq. (4) with Eq. (23) yields the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. Making the ambiguity-averse competitive firm more ambiguity averse by
replacing ϕ(U) by K[ϕ(U)] reduces the optimal output level, i.e., Q† < Q∗, if, and only if,
the covariance between K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} and ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ˜)]UQ(Q
∗, θ˜) is negative.
Proof. Differentiating the objective function of program (22) with respect to Q, and
evaluating the resulting derivative at Q = Q∗ yields
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
K{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗
=
∫ θ
θ
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]}ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ). (24)
Using Eq. (4), we can write Eq. (24) as
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
K{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗
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= CovG
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}, ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ˜)]UQ(Q
∗, θ˜)
}
. (25)
It then follows from Eqs. (6) and (23) that Q† < Q∗ if, and only if, the covariance term on
the right-hand side of Eq. (25) is negative. 2
Proposition 4 provides a necessary and sufficient condition under which greater am-
biguity aversion adversely affects the firm’s production decision. To see the intuition for
Proposition 4, we use Eq. (12) to compare the ambiguity premium under ϕ(U) and that
under K[ϕ(U)], both of which are evaluated at Q = Q∗:
CovG{ϕ
′[U(Q∗, θ˜)], UQ(Q
∗, θ˜)}
EF◦{u′[P˜Q∗ − C(Q∗)]}EG{ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}
−
CovG{K
′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ˜)], UQ(Q
∗, θ˜)}
EF◦{u′[P˜Q∗ − C(Q∗)]}EG{K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}
= −
CovG{K
′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}, ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ˜)]UQ(Q
∗, θ˜)}
EF◦{u′[P˜Q∗ − C(Q∗)]}EG{K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}
, (26)
where we have used Eq. (4). Given that the covariance between K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} and
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ˜)]UQ(Q
∗, θ˜) is negative, it follows from Eq. (26) that the ambiguity premium
is more negative under K[ϕ(U)] than under ϕ(U). Greater ambiguity aversion as such
reduces the certainty equivalent marginal revenue. To restore the optimality condition that
the certainty equivalent marginal revenue is equated to the marginal cost of production, the
more ambiguity-averse firm finds it optimal to produce less than Q∗.
The necessary and sufficient condition as stated in Proposition 4, which ensures the
ambiguity premium to be more negative as the firm becomes more ambiguity averse, is
rather complicated. As such , we derive in the following proposition more tangible sufficient
conditions under which greater ambiguity aversion adversely affects the firm’s production
decision.
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Proposition 5. Making the ambiguity-averse competitive firm more ambiguity averse reduces
the optimal output level, i.e., Q† < Q∗, if the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion,
R(Π) = −Πu′′(Π)/u′(Π), does not exceed unity, and if an increase in the parameter, θ,
always deteriorates (improves) the subjective cumulative distribution function, F (P |θ), in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
Proof. Differentiating K ′{ϕ′[U(Q, θ)} with respect to θ yields
∂
∂θ
K ′{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}
= −
∫ P
P
K ′′{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}ϕ′[U(Q, θ)]u′[PQ− C(Q)]QFθ(P |θ)dP, (27)
where Fθ(P |θ) = ∂F (P |θ)/∂θ, and we have used integration by parts. If R(Π) ≤ 1 and
an increase in θ always deteriorates (improves) F (P |θ) in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance, Eq. (14) implies that UQ(Q
∗, θ) is decreasing (increasing) in θ, and Eq. (27)
implies that K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} is increasing (decreasing) in θ. From Proposition 2, we have
Q∗ < Q◦ so that Eqs. (6) and (7) imply that
∫ θ
θ
UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ) > 0, (28)
Consider first the case that an increase in θ always deteriorates F (P |θ) in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance. Since ∂UQ(Q
∗, θ)/∂θ < 0, there are two possible cases
that are consistent with Eq. (28): (i) UQ(Q
∗, θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ), and (ii) there exists
a unique point, θ1 ∈ (θ, θ) such that UQ(Q
∗, θ) > (<) 0 for all θ < (>) θ1. In case (i), the
right-hand side of Eq. (24) must be positive. Using Eq. (4), we can write Eq. (24) as
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
K{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗
=
∫ θ
θ
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} −K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]}
}
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ). (29)
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Since ∂K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]}/∂θ > 0, we have K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} < K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} for all θ ∈
[θ, θ). It then follows from UQ(Q
∗, θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ) that the right-hand side of Eq.
(29) is negative, a contradiction. Hence, case (i) cannot hold. In case (ii), we can use Eq.
(4) to write Eq. (24) as
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
K{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗
=
∫ θ
θ
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} −K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ1)]}
}
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ). (30)
Since K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} < (>) K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ1)]} and UQ(Q
∗, θ) > (<) 0 for all θ < (>) θ1,
the right-hand side of Eq. (30) is negative. It then follows from Eqs. (6) and (23) that
Q† < Q∗.
Consider now the case that an increase in θ always improves F (P |θ) in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance. Since ∂UQ(Q
∗, θ)/∂θ > 0, there are two possible cases
that are consistent with Eq. (28): (i) UQ(Q
∗, θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ], and (ii) there exists
a unique point, θ2 ∈ (θ, θ) such that UQ(Q
∗, θ) < (>) 0 for all θ < (>) θ2. In case (i), the
right-hand side of Eq. (24) must be positive. Using Eq. (4), we can write Eq. (24) as
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
K{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗
=
∫ θ
θ
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} −K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]}
}
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ). (31)
Since ∂K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]}/∂θ < 0, we have K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} < K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} for all θ ∈
(θ, θ]. It then follows from UQ(Q
∗, θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ (θ, θ] that the right-hand side of Eq.
(31) is negative, a contradiction. Hence, case (i) cannot hold. In case (ii), we can use Eq.
(4) to write Eq. (24) as
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
K{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗
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=
∫ θ
θ
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} −K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ2)]}
}
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ). (32)
Since K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} > (<) K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ2)]} and UQ(Q
∗, θ) < (>) 0 for all θ < (>) θ2,
the right-hand side of Eq. (32) is negative. It then follows from Eqs. (6) and (23) that
Q† < Q∗. 2
To see the intuition for Proposition 5, we consider the distorted second-order CDF,
H(θ), given by Eq. (15) with Q◦ replaced by Q∗. Define the following function:
Hˆ(θ) =
∫ θ
θ
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, X)]}
EH{K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}}
dH(X) =
EH{K
′{ϕ[U(Q∗, X˜)]}|X˜ ≤ θ}
EH{K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ˜)]}}
H(θ), (33)
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], where EH(·) is the expectation operator with respect to the CDF, H(θ).
It is evident from Eq. (33) that Hˆ(θ) = 0, Hˆ(θ) = 1, and Hˆ ′(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ] so
that we can interpret Hˆ(θ) as another distorted second-order CDF of θ˜. From Eqs. (4),
(6), (24), and (33), we have Q† < Q∗ if, and only if,
∫ θ
θ
UQ(Q
∗, θ)dH(θ) = 0⇒
∫ θ
θ
UQ(Q
∗, θ)dHˆ(θ) < 0. (34)
We can interpret the left-hand side of condition (34) as the optimality condition when the
firm is ambiguity neutral and has the second-order CDF, H(θ). The right-hand side of
condition (16) is then the condition that ensures the ambiguity-neutral firm to reduce its
optimal output level when the second-order CDF of θ˜ is shifted from H(θ) to Hˆ(θ). Hence,
the effect of greater ambiguity aversion on the ambiguity-averse firm’s production decision
is identical to the comparative static result of a shift in ambiguity from H(θ) to Hˆ(θ) on
the ambiguity-neutral firm’s optimal output level.
Using Leibniz’s rule, we differentiate EH{K
′{ϕ[U(Q∗, X˜)]}|X˜ ≤ θ} with respect to θ to
yield
∂
∂θ
EH
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, X˜)]}
∣∣∣∣X˜ ≤ θ
}
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=
H ′(θ)
H(θ)
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} − EH
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, X˜)]}
∣∣∣∣X˜ ≤ θ
}}
. (35)
Differentiating K ′{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]} with respect to θ yields
∂
∂θ
K ′{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}
= −
∫ P
P
K ′′{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}ϕ′[U(Q, θ)]u′[PQ− C(Q)]QFθ(P |θ)dP. (36)
It follows from Eq. (36) that the right-hand side of Eq. (35) is positive (negative) if an
increase in θ deteriorates (improves) F (P |θ) in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance,
i.e., Fθ(P |θ) > (<) 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. It then follows from Eqs. (33) and (35) that
Hˆ(θ) < (>) H(θ) for all θ ∈ (θ, θ) so that Hˆ(θ) dominates (is dominated by) H(θ) in the
sense of first-order stochastic dominance if Fθ(P |θ) > (<) 0 for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. In this case,
condition (34) holds if, and only if, UQ(Q
∗, θ) is decreasing (increasing) in θ, which, from
Eq. (14), is true if the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion does not exceed unity, i.e.,
R(Π) ≤ 1.
Following Alary et al. (2013) and Snow (2011), we consider the case that the price risk
is binary: P˜ = P with the subjective probability, ρ(θ), and P˜ = P with the complementary
subjective probability, 1 − ρ(θ). We show in the following proposition that the greater
ambiguity aversion always induces the firm to reduce its optimal output.
Proposition 6. Given that the price risk, P˜ , is binary, making the ambiguity-averse com-
petitive firm more ambiguity averse always reduces the optimal output level, i.e., Q† < Q∗.
Proof. We write K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} as
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} = K ′
{
ϕ{ρ(θ)u[PQ∗ − C(Q∗)] + [1− ρ(θ)]u[PQ∗ −C(Q∗)]}
}
. (37)
Since K ′′(·) < 0, it follows from Eq. (37) that K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} increases with an increase
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in ρ(θ). Likewise, we write ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ) as
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ) = ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]
{
u′[PQ∗ − C(Q∗)][P −C′(Q∗)]
−ρ(θ){u′[PQ∗ −C(Q∗)][P −C′(Q∗)] + u′[PQ◦ − C(Q∗)][C′(Q∗)− P ]}
}
. (38)
Since P < C′(Q∗) < P , it follows from Eq. (38) that ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ) decreases with
an increase in ρ(θ). Given Eq. (4), ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ) changes sign from positive to
negative at ρ(θ) = ρ(θ∗) as ρ(θ) increases for a unique value of θ∗ ∈ (θ, θ). Using Eq. (4),
we can write Eq. (24) as
∂
∂Q
∫ θ
θ
K{ϕ[U(Q, θ)]}dG(θ)
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q∗
=
∫
{θ:ρ(θ)≤ρ(θ∗)}
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} −K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ∗)]}
}
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ)
+
∫
{θ:ρ(θ)>ρ(θ∗)}
{
K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)]} −K ′{ϕ[U(Q∗, θ∗)]}
}
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ)dG(θ),
which is negative. It then follows from Eqs. (6) and (23) that Q† < Q∗. 2
The intuition for Proposition 6 is as follows. From Eqs. (4) and (38), it is true that
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ) > 0 when ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)] is high, i.e., when ρ(θ) < ρ(θ∗), and that
ϕ′[U(Q∗, θ)]UQ(Q
∗, θ) < 0 when ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)] is low, i.e., when ρ(θ) > ρ(θ∗). Given Eq.
(4), the expected value of ϕ[U(Q∗, θ)] remains unchanged for a marginal change in output
from Q∗. Hence, a marginal reduction in output from Q∗ gives rise to a mean-preserving
contraction in the distribution of ϕ[U(Q∗, θ˜)]. The firm, being more ambiguity averse, has a
concave transformation of ϕ(U), thereby choosing to cut down its production, i.e., Q∗ < Q◦,
in response to greater ambiguity aversion.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the production decision of the competitive firm under price
uncertainty a` la Sandmo (1971) when the firm’s preferences exhibit smooth ambiguity
aversion developed by Klibanoff et al. (2005). The KMM model represents ambiguity by
a second-order probability distribution that captures the firm’s uncertainty about which
of the subjective beliefs govern the price risk. The KMM model then measures the firm’s
expected utility under ambiguity by taking the (second-order) expectation of a concave
transformation of the (first-order) expected utility of profit conditional on each plausible
subjective distribution of the price risk.
Within the KMM model, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which
the ambiguity-averse firm optimally produces less in response either to the introduction
of ambiguity or to greater ambiguity aversion when ambiguity prevails. These conditions
ensure that the ambiguity premium is negative (more negative as the firm becomes more
ambiguity averse), thereby inducing the firm to cut down its optimal output level so as
to equate the certainty equivalent marginal revenue to the marginal cost of production.
We further derive more tangible sufficient conditions under which ambiguity and greater
ambiguity aversion adversely affect the firm’s production decision. These conditions include
the firm’s coefficient of relative risk aversion not to exceed unity and its subjective beliefs
to be ranked in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Finally, we show that the
adverse effect of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion on output always prevails when the price
risk is binary.
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